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Abstract 
As technology evolves and globalization continues, the need for reasonably priced roaming services 
has never been higher. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) introduced a first set of regulatory 
decisions to cap the maximal roaming fee end users have to pay for voice services. In the years after, 
additional price caps have been introduced for SMS and data, initially only for end users, in a later 
stage also for the wholesale tariff. The final step, Roaming Like at Home (RLAH), will start to take 
effect in June 2017; from then on end users will pay the same price (for voice, SMS and data) when 
roaming like in their domestic country. 
The effect of RLAH on the business case of each mobile operator is hard to predict, as the different 
national markets are extremely heterogeneous and operators face large discrepancies in terms of 
roaming usage and network costs due to different traveling patterns and various other reasons that 
cannot be harmonized (geography, economics, working force, usage history, etc.). Furthermore, 
competition in the telecom market will no longer be a purely national matter, as the decision to 
abolish roaming tariffs will fully open up cross-border competition.  
This paper aims at providing insights in the effect of RLAH for both the end user as well as the mobile 
operators. Following a literature survey approach, including an overview of the roaming regulation 
process from 2007 up to now, the paper discusses possible effects the RLAH initiative might trigger, 
going from lower wholesale prices for mobile operators to higher retail prices for end users. 
Additionally, as the European Commission strives for a digital single market, this paper presents a 
number of technical solutions (carrier portability, software-based SIMs, cross-border IMSI, Roaming 
like a Local, Wi-Fi offloading) that may pose a - partial or full - alternative for roaming and explains 
how these may impact cross-border competition both positively and negatively. The solutions are 
assessed against two axes: (1) generating the best possible outcome for the end customers (in all 
countries) and (2) ensuring the best level playing field for (virtual) mobile operators in Europe, which 
will of course involve trade-offs on different levels. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
The globalization of the world is changing the way we live. The increased integration between 
European countries as well as the increasing prosperity of the EU citizens has led to an increase in 
intra-European travel (Eurostat, n.d.). People have always had an interest in using mobile services 
while travelling internationally, and the smartphone revolution  always being connected  has only 
increased this trend.  
When using mobile services in a foreign country, your local provider  the Domestic Service Provider 
(DSP)  cannot rely on its own network for voice or data transmissions (unless it is a cross-country 
operator such as Vodafone or Deutsche Telekom, owning networks in multiple countries). Because 
of this, users have no other choice than to rely on the network of an operator in the visited country 
 a Foreign Service Provider (FSP). When a user is connected on an s network, using a process 
referred to as international mobile roaming (IMR), the DSP will be charged a fee (the wholesale 
roaming fee1) by the FSP, as the FSP is offering connectivity to the end user on behalf of the DSP. The 
DSP of course will recuperate this cost on the retail level by charging the end user a retail roaming 
charge. 
In the past, retail pricing for roaming services was significantly higher than retail pricing for local 
services, resulting in travelers being reluctant to use IMR. Users were afraid of receiving high bills 
(causing bill shocks ) when using (data) roaming services. This resulted in most of the travelers 
deciding to switch off their mobile handset during the whole trip, switch off the data roaming 
capabilities of their mobile phone or smartphone, or only connect to the Internet using public or 
private Wi-Fi access points (European Commission, 2014a). This impacted both DSPs and FSPs, as 
additional revenues were hampered due to a more limited usage of mobile services when roaming. 
Furthermore, as Neelie Kroes (European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda) indicated: s not 
just a fight between holiday-makers and telecoms companies. Millions of businesses face extra costs 
because of roaming, (...) Roaming makes no sense in a (European) single market   economic 
 (European Commission, 2014b). In other words, the European roaming problem not only 
affects people who travel for pleasure but also businesses whose employees travel around Europe, 
which translates into significant roaming bills. 
To counter these problems caused by high mobile retail roaming prices, the European Commission 
(EC) started to regulate the international wholesale and retail roaming markets within the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Their purpose was, and still is, to reduce retail roaming charges to zero (i.e. 
lowering roaming pricing to the same level as local retail pricing) in other words, roam like at home 
(RLAH). This means that every citizen of a country in the EEA will be able use their mobile services in 
every other country of the EEA at the same price as in their own domestic country. At first, this 
approach seems to yield nothing but benefits for the customer; however, there are a number of 
threats and consequences that may arise as a direct result of RLAH: Will pricing differences arise 
between countries where a lot of travelers travel to in comparison to countries where a lot of 
travelers travel from? Will virtual operators (MVNOs  Mobile Virtual Network Operators) face a 
                                               
1 Please note the difference between wholesale costs, wholesale charges and wholesale caps. Wholesale costs 
denote the actual cost for the foreign service operator (FSP) to allow roamers  traffic on its network. The 
wholesale cap is the maximum fee this FSP may charge the DSP, and has been set by Europe Commission. The 
wholesale charge, ideally, lies in between the wholesale cost and wholesale cap, and is the actual fee the DSP 
pays to the FSP, based on inter-operator negotiations. The wholesale charge is therefore frequently referred to 
as inter-operator tariff. The retail roaming charge is the fee an end user pays the DSP when roaming. 
  
competitive disadvantage in the national market as they only have an outflow of roaming wholesale 
cost, which can no longer be recuperated? Are the benefits for international providers significant or 
rather disruptive to good market functioning? In this paper, we discuss a number of these 
(unwanted) effects and how these might affect the end users. 
 
This paper starts by giving a short overview of the evolution of roaming in the EU, focusing on the 
events that led to the introduction of RLAH. In section 3, we link the evolution of wholesale caps to 
the actually paid wholesale rates. Section 4 discusses the economic and business impact for 
customers and telecom operators. Based on both the technological possibilities and economic 
implications, a number of possible strategies and solutions for the future are discussed in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
At the beginning of this publication, we would like to stress that the goal of this writing is to provide 
a high level overview of both the past and upcoming roaming legislative steps, supported by actual 
figures, and the effects on the business case of different mobile (virtual) network operators. This 
also implies that a quantitative cost-benefit analysis is not within the scope of this publication, due 
to the fact that this type of data is kept highly confidential by mobile operators. Furthermore, as the 
evolution towards RLAH is an ongoing process, new effects may arise quickly as the market adapts to 
the new ruleset. We would therefore ask the reader to acknowledge the timestamp of this paper, 
being beginning of January 2017. 
 
2. The evolution of roaming in the EU 
This chapter will give a rather brief overview of the major developments and EU initiatives on 
international roaming. For a detailed and historic overview of how the EU increasingly regulated the 
international roaming market, we refer to Infante, and Vallejo (2012). For a larger view on the recent 
developments in other regions outside the EU, we refer to the OECD (Bourassa et al., 2016) and ITU 
(ITU, n.d.); both institutions describe the progress made in reducing roaming prices in various 
regions throughout the world and give an overview of the work done by wireless industry 
associations and regional bodies. Sutherland (2012) and Marcus (n.d.) have also published articles 
describing the evolution of international roaming in different regions, including amongst others the 
EU, USA, and Asia.  
In 1999, the international telecommunications  association (INTUG) analyzed the price 
difference between international calls (a call from the home country to another country) and 
roaming calls (making a call when roaming internationally), indicating that the price range between 
the two type of calls is unjustified and could not be convincingly motivated by underlying technical 
explanation (Sutherland, 1999; European Commission, 2000). INTUG furthermore pointed out that 
the underlying wholesale roaming markets are not competitive. Following up on this complaint, the 
EC started to be concerned about the high prices of roaming and launched a sector investigation, 
which led to the conclusion that there was a market failure in the International Roaming Services 
(IRS) wholesale markets. This market failure existed because of a lack of competition among 
operators, due to the absence of incentives for the operators. Therefore, the EC decided to include 
this market ( national wholesale market for international roaming services on public mobile 
networks ) in the 2003 EC recommendation on relevant markets, making it become subject to ex-
ante regulation. This regulatory framework supports that ex-ante regulatory obligations should only 
be imposed where there is no effective competition, and this only on operators designated as having 
  
significant market power (European Commission, 2012). The national regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
were obliged to define and assess the conditions of effective competition. However, assessment - by 
the NRAs as well as the European Regulators Group (ERG) and its successor the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) - of the IMR market demonstrated that it was not 
possible for an NRA to effectively address the high level of wholesale Union-wide roaming charges. 
The explanation for this can be found in the combination of (1) the cross-border nature of 
international roaming and (2) the fact that NRAs can only impose remedies on operators in their 
own territory (Infante, and Vallejo, 2012). As NRAs were not able to successfully tackle high roaming 
costs independently and because the pressure from Member States and the European Parliament 
grew accordingly, the EC imposed a roaming regulation (the so-called Eurotariff) for the whole EEA 
in 2007 (directly applicable in all Member States) based on the following key facts: 
(1) both wholesale and retail prices were not justified by the underlying costs (international 
roaming charges were 3 5 times higher than the costs (Falch and Tadayoni, 2014)), 
(2) the lack of retail price transparency (most of consumers were not aware of the high charges 
for incoming calls),  
(3) both issues could not be solved using the existing regulatory tools (Scaramuzzi, 2009).  
 
This 2007 Roaming Regulation (Roaming I) introduced caps for voice wholesale and retail prices (for 
both incoming and outgoing calls), effectively forcing the operators to use this so-called Eurotariff by 
default. Operators were (and are) however still allowed to charge other pricing tariffs, but only to 
those customers who would choose for such alternative plans voluntarily. Examples of these plans 
are Vodafone Eurotraveller or Daily Travel Passport: Day-roaming passes  or Weekly roaming 
passes  that provide a certain number of roaming units for a fixed fee. Additionally, each customer 
would receive a free text message when travelling, informing him/her about the roaming charges, in 
order to increase transparency about pricing. 
In June 2009, the Roaming Regulation I was reviewed, leading to Roaming II. The EC decided to 
continue its price caps strategy for voice, lowering them in order to reduce the gap between 
wholesale and retail prices. Additionally, SMS and data service prices were regulated. For SMS, both 
wholesale and retail caps were imposed (for both incoming and outgoing), whereas for data 
services, the regulation remained limited to wholesale caps (because the market for data services 
was then still emerging, and its estimated evolution was not completely clear). Finally, a feature to 
protect consumers from bill shocks  was introduced: if a certain billing amount for data services is 
reached ( 50 excl. VAT by default), the operator is obliged to notify its user. At this point, users can 
decide to spend more money on data services or stop the service. 
The imposed regulations reduced retail roaming charges for intra-European traffic significantly2. This 
especially was true for data services: though a significant reduction in wholesale charges was 
imposed, reduction in retail roaming charges then (in 2012) did not follow at all (BEREC, 2012a). This 
observation was also found by Infante and Vallejo (2012), who used empirical data to show that 
wholesale regulation alone does not suffice to ensure that competition at wholesale level is passed 
on to the retail level  Similarly, based on the reasonable assumption that wholesale prices are 
                                               
2
 When comparing pricing in 2011 with extra-European traffic prices, so called Rest of the World (RoW traffic), prices were about three 
times as high as prices for intra-European traffic (Infante and Vallejo, 2012). Now (beginning of 2017), the difference is up to 20 times or 
higher. As a (Belgian) Proximus customer roaming in the USA, for example, you pay 3 per minute of calling and close to 15 per MB of 
data (Proximus, 2016). The roaming tariffs for Orange when travelling to the USA are 1.18 per minute, 2.9 per minute from China. Every 
MB will cost you 13.31 (Orange, 2016). r 
  
related to the respective cost for the operators, BEREC assessed the wholesale roaming market and 
conducted an estimation of the wholesale roaming costs to better estimate the pricing regulation 
(BEREC, 2010a). As the report pointed out that costs had decreased over the years, it was decided to 
further reduce roaming fees, for both retail and wholesale.  
As a result, the EC decided in 2012 to review the regulation, lowering once again the existing caps 
and adding retail caps for data services for the first time (Roaming III). Table 1 and Figure 1 present 
the evolution of the regulated wholesale and retail prices of voice calls, SMS and data services for 
the three roaming regulations induced by the EC. 
 
Table 1: Evolution of wholesale and retail price caps (eurocents, excl. VAT) for voice calls, SMS and data services 
  Outbound call  SMS  Data  
  Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 
Roaming I 30 Aug. 2007 30 49     
 30 Aug. 2008 28 46     
Roaming II 1 July 2009 26 43 4 11 100  
 1 July 2010 22 39 4 11 80  
 1 July 2011 18 35 4 11 50  
Roaming III 1 July 2012 14 29 3 9 25 70 
 1 July 2013 10 24 2 8 15 45 
 1 July 2014 5 19 2 6 5 20 
 1 July 2015 5 19 2 6 5 20 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of wholesale and retail price caps (eurocents, excl. VAT) for voice calls, SMS and data services 
During all transitory phases the European Commission, together with BEREC, also assessed other 
approaches that could lead to a full elimination of price difference between domestic and roaming 
tariffs (European Commission, 2011a; BEREC, 2010a; BEREC, 2011a). Two alternative approaches 
mentioned in 2010 were Roam Like at Home (RLAH)  and Roam Like a Local (RLAL)  RLAH implies 
operators charging the same price for international (within the EEA) roaming services as for 
domestic mobile services, whereas RLAL entails that an end-user should be paying a price which fits 
  
the mobile market of the visited country (see further in section 5.4). Both approaches indicate that 
all underlying costs (transit, fixed and operational) related to roaming would become completely 
invisible to the end user. Although RLAH is considered the most straightforward and consumer-
friendly option, some issues could arise, such as arbitrage of SIM cards from countries with low 
domestic prices being used in countries with high domestic prices (so called permanent roaming, see 
further in 4.2.2). In 2011, stakeholders (consumer bodies, regulators and industry stakeholders) 
indicated that RLAH was a better option than RLAL, because RLAL would complicate the tariff 
structure (European Commission, 2011a). BEREC pointed out that RLAH would be more transparent, 
however not suitable for 2012, to be reconsidered in subsequent review of regulation for post-
2015  (BEREC, 2010a). Hence, the continuation of the existing price cap model was favored by most 
stakeholder groups. 
Suddenly, in September 2013, one year after Roaming III came into force, Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes introduced her plans to impose Roam Like at Home (RLAH)  (European Commission, 2013). 
The EU Parliament highly welcomed this initiative and voted to abolish retail roaming surcharges in 
April 2014, hoping for a quick implementation at the end of 2015 (European Commission, 2014c). 
This deadline was exceeded, partly due to the legislative procedure in Europe, giving the same 
weight to the European Parliament as to the Council of the European Union. It was in the Council 
that the Member States heated up the discussion, questioning under which conditions to abolish 
retail roaming charges, pointing out that these charges represent a significant part of the overall 
mobile revenues of telecom players (which is discussed in section 3). Member States wanted to 
assure a smooth and painless transition for the telecom sector and agreed that legislators first had 
to reassess the wholesale roaming market before retail roaming charges could be reduced to zero 
within the EU.  
After lengthy discussions, it was only in November 2015 that the legislative process was finalized, 
postponing the deadline of the reduction-to-zero strategy to June 2017, on the condition that the 
wholesale market is reformed by that date. This means that, after more than 10 years of regulations 
and price caps, European retail roaming surcharges will be abolished entirely and users will be 
charged their domestic prices when travelling within the EU allowing them to  like at . In 
the meantime, and despite the delayed introduction of RLAH, a trend towards RLAH was already 
observed in the market as more and more operators introduced RLAH-style tariff plans. BEREC 
reported that in 2015, more than 25% of the larger operators in the EEA offer such a mobile plan, 
creating more market dynamics (BEREC, 2015a). In 2016, the number increased to 37% of the 
operators in the EEA. BEREC acknowledges that there is already a significant number of roaming 
providers offering pure RLAH tariffs for their customers without any limitation beyond the volume 
limits included in the domestic offers  (BEREC, 2016a).  
 
In order to build op to RLAH an intermediate regulation was introduced (Table 1). Whereas the three 
initial roaming actions stated absolute limits for retail prices (e.g. wholesale cap of 20 eurocent per 
MB for data from 01/07/2015, see Table 1), this last step lowered the retail caps to the sum of the 
domestic price plus the wholesale prices for calls, SMS and data. This intermediate phase is called 
the  phase as during this period the end-user is paying its domestic price + a small surcharge. 
For data, for example, the retail cap is currently set to the sum of the domestic retail price plus 5 
cents (the wholesale rate). If the retail rate for data is considered 10 MB, the retail roaming cap 
would thus be 15 /MB. Important to notice is that, during the RLAH+ phase the absolute caps of 
  
Roaming III are still in effect, meaning that relative caps (Table 1) cannot surpass the caps of 
Roaming III effectively protecting the end-users of any temporarily price increases. 
 
Table 2: Intermediate step of the retail price caps (eurocents, excl. VAT) for voice calls, SMS and data services, leading 
up to the introduction of Roaming Like At Home (European Commission, 2015a) 
  Outbound call  SMS  Data ( MB) 
  Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 
RLAH+ 
phase 
30 April 2016 
until 
14 June 2017 
5 Domestic  
+ 5 
2 Domestic  
 + 2 
5 Domestic 
 + 5 
 
In June 2016, the European Commission proposed new wholesale rates that will, if accepted, come 
into effect from the 15th of June 2017 onwards (European Commission, 2016a). These proposed 
rates are based on a review of the wholesale roaming market combined with a cost model. The 
proposed rates were discussed in the European Parliament, leading to an agreement on 29 
November 2016 (European Parliament, 2016), and in the Council, leading to an agreement on 2 
December 2016 (European Council, 2016). As a next step, a trialogue procedure started on 14 
December, leading up to the ultimate negotiations on the final wholesale roaming caps before the 
approval of the EU Parliament, expected in February 2017. It should be noted that the discussions in 
Council and Parliament were rendered more difficult due to the interference of legislative decisions 
regarding the Fair Use Policy for RLAH and the sustainability derogation for operators (more about 
Fair use Policies in 4.2.2), as these discussions took place in the same timeframe.  
 
Table 3: Newly proposed wholesale rates, which take effect on the 15th of June 2017 (if accepted) in support of the RLAH 
initiative. 
  Outbound call  SMS  Data ( MB) 
  Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 
RLAH From  
15 June 2017 
 
4 Domestic 1 Domestic 0.85 Domestic 
 
 
Though the abolition of roaming pricing in Europe is beneficial for every European traveler, it is likely 
to have a negative impact on most operators (apart from larger cross-country operators such as 
Telefónica or Vodafone). The impact on the business case for the different operators is not 
comparable, on the one hand due to the differences between MNOs and MVNOs, but on the other 
hand due to the significant differences between the member states, such as the levels of retail 
tariffs, cost structures, and travelling and consumption patterns. With RLAH, it can be expected that 
the use of roaming services will grow, bigger wholesale bills for the operators. In addition, they will 
have to face the increasing demands on their networks.  
It can be concluded that roaming in Europe has gone through multiple processes of regulation since 
2007, first by imposing wholesale and retail price caps for calls, then for SMS and finally for data. The 
next step is to abolish the retail roaming charges entirely, resulting in users paying the same price 
whatever the country (of the EC) they are vising; hence permitting them to roam like at home   
  
There however remain several aspects that need further clarification, especially for the operators, as 
questions rise how they are going to sustain this transition. This paper aims at listing the threats and 
opportunities, as well as proposing solutions or strategies for the future. 
 
3. Description of the mobile data roaming market 
Section 2 provided an overview of both previous and future intended steps regarding the European 
roaming legislation, while section 4 will list potential strategies for the future from the viewpoint of 
different operators. This section links both by analyzing if evidence supports the claims made by 
different kinds of stakeholders: it compares the imposed wholesale caps to the actually paid 
wholesale rates and the underlying wholesale costs (section 3.1). Afterwards, in section 3.2, a 
number of examples of the predicted impact of the RLAH+ phase by mobile operators are added 
(taken Belgium as an exemplary country).  
3.1. Linking legislation to actually paid wholesale rates 
When mapping the average paid wholesale rates on the evolution of the wholesale caps (the 
analysis first focuses on mobile data as the decrease of these wholesale caps has been most 
significant in the last years), the average paid wholesale rate has constantly been below the actual 
cap Figure 2. The downward trend is clearly noticeable, even when the wholesale caps are stable 
and bigger step are detected when lower caps are imposed (e.g. Q3 2012 and Q3 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the EEA average of the wholesale data price per MB (prepaid and postpaid) and the matching 
wholesale cap, (BEREC, 2016c). 
Negotiations on bilateral wholesale agreements between operators are based upon a set of different 
pricing models (fixed rate, balanced/unbalanced pricing, volume commitment, etc.). The 
balanced/unbalanced pricing model is rather important to zoom in on (BEREC, 2016b). In this kind of 
agreement, two operators agree to send traffic over each other s network. If both operators send an 
equal amount of traffic, the exchange is balanced and so are the costs and revenues of each 
operator, resulting in a financial zero-sum game. In case the amounts are unbalanced, the netto 
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sender operator (the operator with more outgoing traffic) pays a pre-discussed wholesale rate to the 
netto receiving operator. 
According to (BEREC, 2016b) the relevant benchmark for wholesale costs is the wholesale rate for 
unbalanced traffic, given that prices for balanced traffic are merely a bilateral transfer between 
operators with no net cost for any of the parties. When zooming in on the wholesale rates for 
unbalanced traffic, Figure 3, it becomes clear that median value (as indicated by the thicker line in 
the boxplot) at about 1.4 eurocent/MB is even lower than the average wholesale rate in Q3 2015, 
see Figure 2(which combined both balanced and unbalanced traffic). The data as seen in was 
collected by BEREC and supplied by the different NRAs. A reason why the rates are higher for 
balanced than for unbalanced is not provided. 
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of the actually paid wholesale rates, with the distinction between balanced and unbalanced traffic 
(BEREC, 2016b). 
 
Prices that are considerably lower than the imposed caps might suggest a competitive market. 
However, the wholesale roaming market should not be considered a competitive market, for a 
number of reasons as discussed in European Commission (2016e):  
a) The specific character of the mobile market: the choice of FSPs in the visited country is 
limited, and some of them are difficult to avoid (in view of coverage and capacity), further 
limiting competition; 
b) The bilateral nature of wholesale roaming agreements: the main negotiation driver is the 
amount of traffic that can be balanced rather than the price;   
c) No real wholesale roaming substitute: there exists no alternative to roaming that achieves 
the same coverage and flexibility;  
d) The de facto exclusion of MVNOs from the wholesale roaming market 
 
When furthermore comparing the wholesale rates with the estimation of the maximal wholesale 
cost as made by BEREC in 2010 (BEREC, 2010a) and 2012 (BEREC, 2012b) one can see that the 
maximal costs are below the actually paid fee (Table 4). The result of this analysis, being that caps 
are significantly higher than rates, and rates in turn significantly higher that maximal costs, suggests 
that there is room for further reducing the wholesale roaming caps. 
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Table 4: Overview of the estimated maximal underlying cost of providing roaming 
 Max Cap Max Cap 
 2010 Until 
 
From  
 
2012 Until 
 
From  
 
Outgoing Voice  9.7 26 22 5 18 14 
SMS  2.7 4 4 1 4 3 
Data  15 100 80 5 50 25 
 
 
 
When looking into the estimation study executed by TERA consultants (TERA Consultants, 2016) and 
shown in Figure 4, which has been an important input in the discussion for the newly proposed 
wholesale rates, we clearly see that the wholesale rates (median value about 1.4 eurocent/MB), 
which are considerably lower than the imposed caps, are far above the actual costs Figure 4. The 
results and validity of the TERA report have been discussed by people of Rewheel in (Rewheel, 
2016). 
 
 
Figure 4: Total estimated wholesale roaming unit costs for data service  as calculated by TERA consultants 
(2016) 
 
When RLAH comes into effect, mobile operators will no longer be allowed to charge additional fees 
on top of the domestic retail price. In other words, the domestic retail price should cover the entire 
wholesale rate, all internal costs (administration, billing, ) and preferably still include some profit 
margin. When comparing the domestic retail price per GB with the currently proposed new 
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wholesale rates of 8.5 euro/GB (Table 3), we see that this newly proposed cap is higher than average 
(data-only) domestic retail price per GB in 26 out of 28 EU states. Similar results are found for non-
data-only deals and are discussed in more detail in (Rewheel, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 5: Average domestic retail price per GB for data-only subscriptions 
From the suggested caps (and thus the maximal fee an operator will have to pay for a GB of outgoing 
roaming traffic) and the current retail pricing for mobile data, we can deduct that the average 
domestic revenue per GB is much lower than this suggested cap (and thus cost for a mobile 
operator), which might suggest that the current caps should further be decreased to have any effect, 
as discussed in more detail in (Rewheel, 2016). 
The differences between operators should not be neglected in this analysis. Larger MNOs typically 
have sufficient bargaining power to discuss wholesale tariffs that are well below the caps, whereas 
MVNOs and small MNOs typically lack this power, ending up paying a wholesale rate that is very 
closely to the caps. They should search for an alternative way to compensate this potential revenue 
loss.. This is also confirmed by BEREC: Light and full mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) see 
their position as weak compared to MNOs due to their lack of volumes and associated negotiating 
power. Overall, these operators are not seen to benefit from the lower actual observed wholesale 
tariffs, especially for data, when compared with the current wholesale caps.  (BEREC, 2016b). 
 
When looking at the link between the actually wholesale rates and the caps for voice calls and SMS 
we see a different story; for both the actually paid rates have consistently been very close to the 
wholesale caps as can be deducted from BEREC (2016c). Due to the massive growth in mobile data 
usage and new services (e.g. WhatsApp) which pose alternatives for both voice and SMS, we have 
chosen to focus on mobile data. 
 
From the analysis of supporting data evidence, it becomes clear that a general conclusion cannot be 
drawn. Different types of mobile operators will be impacted differently by RLAH. Section 4 discusses 
a number of factors which largely determine how much operators will be impacted and how this 
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impact may be leveled, but we first provide exemplary estimations on the impact of the RLAH+ 
phase by a number of Belgian mobile operators in the next paragraph. 
 
3.2. An example from the Belgian telecom market 
In 2015, the Belgian NRA presented an overview of the mobile turnover of Belgian operators as 
shown in Figure 6. The figure shows that the retail roaming revenues for the main Belgian operators 
represented almost 300 million euros in 2015, which is 8.2% of their total mobile turnover. 
Wholesale roaming revenues make up another 2% (69 million) of their turnover (BIPT, 2016). Given 
the fact that RLAH reduces the retail rate for roaming for end-users to zero, this entire 8.2% of the 
mobile turnover is at risk. 
 
 
Figure 6: Overview of the mobile turnover of Belgian operators in 2015 (BIPT, 2016) 
 
This risk of revenue loss has also been discussed by the mobile operators in their financial reports. 
For 2016, Proximus predicted a negative impact of 28 million on their roaming revenues to the 
RLAH+ retail caps; Mobistar predicted a negative impact of 24.5 million. Both MNOs however 
mention that the given figure will most likely be lower due to a positive elasticity effect on the retail 
usage. 
 
4. Economic and business impact of cutting roaming fees 
The prospects of abolishing roaming pricing by 2017 are of course beneficial for travelling 
customers, but also clearly impact the business case for all telecom operators, both MNOs and 
MVNOs (Mobile (Virtual) Network Operators), as the previous section shows. Operators will no 
longer be able to charge roaming fees to customers on the retail level, meaning they will only be 
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compensated with the same price they charge their customers for domestic services, while their 
roaming expenses remain. The absolute impact will depend on the type of operator and its 
geographical coverage and location. This section describes these different impact factors and 
proposes remedies operators can take to counter or at least minimize them. 
4.1. Impact for telecom operators 
As mentioned above, the main impact of reducing retail roaming fees to zero is that the operators 
can no longer charge their customers an additional fee for using mobile services abroad. There are 
however large differences between different types of operators. For MNOs (owning their own 
network), the distinction needs to be made between geographical location and geographical 
coverage. Besides, the costs of providing connectivity (and therefore RLAH) vary significantly across 
the EU, underpinned by significant differences in, e.g., spectrum costs, labor and property costs, and 
coverage obligations and costs due to different geographies, which are major drivers of the cost of 
providing mobile services (BEREC, 2014a). For MVNOs (not having an own physical network), the 
situation has to be assessed differently. 
4.1.1. Impact for MNOs: geographical location 
The impact of cutting roaming fees is significantly different depending on the country the operator is 
active in, mainly because of the different travelling patterns of end users, making operators face 
either incoming roaming traffic (net receiver) or outgoing roaming traffic (net sender) (BEREC, 
2016b).  
For net sender countries (e.g. Scandinavian countries such as Sweden) have much more outgoing 
roaming traffic, which makes the wholesale costs for these operators unbalanced (the 
balanced/unbalanced pricing model has been discussed in section 3). By abolishing the retail 
roaming fees, revenue losses occur. On the other hand, countries with a lot of incoming traffic from 
tourists, such as Spain and Greece, have an incentive to keep wholesale charges high as operators 
need to invest in capacity to allow the additional roaming traffic on their networks 3 (BEREC, 2014a).  
 
4.1.2. Impact of geographical coverage 
One specific category of telecom operators in Europe are those whose coverage region extends 
beyond national borders, the so-called cross-country operators. Table 3 shows an overview of the 
international operators active in Europe, as well as the number of countries they serve. Operators 
who are part of a cross-country group, will be able to get cheap wholesale roaming prices by using 
their own network facilities (Falch and Tadayoni, 2014). They can steer their roaming traffic, making 
wholesale just at cost while other operators face a (negotiation) markup (BEREC, 2014a). 
Table 3: International operators active in the EU (DFMonitor, 2016) 
MNO Number of countries 
Vodafone 15 
Deutsche Telekom 11 
Orange, TeliaSonera 8 
Hutchison, Tele2, Telefonica 6 
                                               
3 For popular travel destinations, the network demands are obviously higher in the touristic season; this so 
called seasonality effect requires network operators to be able to cope with much more incoming roaming 
traffic during only a short period per year. According to (European Commission, 2016c),  effective impact 
of seasonality on the estimation of the upper bound of wholesale roaming costs in the EEA remains   
  
Telenor 5 
TelekomAustria 4 
KPN 3 
Belgacom, BITE, Elisa, Iliad, PPF 2 
 
 
4.1.3. Impact for MVNOs 
Finally, there are MVNOs, those who do not own a physical network. MVNOs resell capacity they 
rent from an MNO and hence challenge the incumbent operators, though often take up only a small 
part of the domestic market. MVNOs incur costs when their customers are travelling, but they do 
not have wholesale incomes as they cannot host any roamers on their network4. They experience 
absolute traffic imbalances and, in most cases, they do not have the bargaining power to negotiate 
wholesale roaming fees significantly below the wholesale caps, as mentioned in 3.1. Hence, MVNOs 
prefer that the EC sets lower wholesale caps, this to mitigate an outflow of wholesale transaction 
which cannot be recuperated on the retail level, and to assure a positive business case for these 
smaller players. If this issue is not tackled accordingly, the introduction of RLAH might have a 
negative side effect on the level of competition within the national market (MVNO Europe, 2015). 
 
4.2. How to reduce or counter this impact? 
As described above, a number of operators across Europe will experience a significant influence 
from cutting the roaming fees. The European Commission has calculated that RLAH would be 
unsustainable for 12% of the operators in the EEA (European Commission, 2016b). This impact 
assessment was made with the assumption that consumers would be able to use RLAH for 90 days a 
year (which was stated in the first draft of the fair use policy). In the meanwhile, the fair use policy 
has widened (e.g. there are no longer any cut-off limits, see further in section 4.2.2), meaning the 
impact could affect even more operators. Taking into account the economical principle that there s 
no such thing as a free lunch, operators will want to recuperate their wholesale roaming costs, 
which can they no longer pass on to the retail customers. As a result, there is a risk these mobile 
operators will increase domestic prices in order to compensate for potential wholesale losses (this is 
the so called 'waterbed effect', see section 4.2.1). Secondly, to prevent abuse of RLAH by 
permanent roaming , Fair Use Limits can protect the providers (section 4.2.2). Finally, operators 
might be able to lower their costs by negotiating new inter-operator (wholesale) pricing (section 
4.2.3).  
4.2.1. Raise domestic prices 
As already mentioned above, a first possibility is to raise the domestic prices, also known as the 
waterbed effect. When the retail roaming prices decrease on one side, the domestic prices could 
increase on the other side (Falch and Tadayoni, 2014). This situation is unfavorable as everyone, also 
the customers who never roam, will need to pay higher domestic prices to cover the losses made by 
                                               
4 All types of MVNOs - except for full-MVNOs - are technically unable to accept any incoming roaming traffic. From a 
technical point of view, full-MVNOs are able to accept incoming roaming traffic, though from an economic point of view 
this will never happen: the wholesale prices a full-MVNO could charge a DSP can never undercut the prices of its host-
MNO. Taking into account even the slightest pricing margin, the wholesale prices a full-MVNO can offer to a DSP will 
always be higher than the ones from the underlying MNO; in other words, a DSP will always cooperate with the MNO for 
the simple reason that its wholesale prices are lower. 
  
the customers who do roam. This means that only the people who roam frequently will benefit from 
this situation. Research by BEREC has proven that the average amount of citizens in the EEA who 
travel at least once a year is 35% and the average days abroad within the EEA is 5.7 days (BEREC, 
2014a). Looking at these numbers, we can say that a large group of customers (mostly low-income 
workers and elderly people) will need to pay more so that a small group of customers who 
frequently roam will pay less (in general business people). How much domestic prices should 
increase to cover for the losses will strongly depend on the local situation (geographical location, net 
sender/receiver country).  
Additionally, it should be noted that, although the waterbed effect may occur, its impact will be 
limited by free market competition - no operator will increase retail pricing to the extent that he will 
lose competitive power. Especially, operators in competitive markets (e.g. the UK or France) might 
be reluctant to increase their domestic prices in order to protect their market share.  
4.2.2. Fair use limits 
When customers do not need to pay roaming surcharges, they might be tempted to purchase a SIM-
card of a foreign operator that offers lower pricing than any domestic operator, hence enjoy cheaper 
pricing and use roaming also when being at home. This scenario, known as permanent roaming, will 
lead to higher wholesale roaming charges for the foreign operator, leading again to the waterbed 
effect. On a larger scale, permanent roaming will also detriment the telecom sector in those 
countries with  on average  more expensive mobile prices.  
Fair Use Limits (FULs) are a way to counter this problem: they set a maximum amount of roaming 
per customer per time period. When the customer exceeds this limit, he will need to pay a 
surcharge. FULs can be implemented in different ways. The limit can be set to a specific amount of 
roaming (e.g. number of SMS, minutes outgoing calls, MB) per day, per week, per month or even per 
year. When the FUL is exceeded, a fair surcharge per usage or daily/weekly flat fee could be levied. 
There will be a need of some caps for the FUL. In December 2016, the EC has formally adopted a 
roaming fair use policy (European Commission, 2016d). This FUP sets no specific limits, but allows 
mobile operators to ask their NRA to apply surcharges to the retail roaming rates of specific users in 
case any abuse of RLAH is detected. 
Alternatively, instead of sticking with the domestic operator and accepting the charges for usage 
beyond the FUL, an end user could switch over to Local Breakout (LBO). LBO is a decoupling5 
mechanism with minimal configuration, which allows a user to buy a roaming bundle from an FSP. 
All data (LBO is not applicable to voice and SMS) is directly charged from the prepaid bundle. As 
calling (VOIP) and texting (e.g. WhatsApp) is increasingly done via the Internet, heavy users could 
still benefit from an LBO package with much more volume than the volume limit of the FUL. 
4.2.3. Decrease wholesale roaming prices 
The third remedy discussed here focuses on the cost side: the best solution for operators might be 
to reduce wholesale charges, the price a DSP needs to pay to the FSP when a DSP s customer is 
roaming on the FSP s network. In the past, these wholesale prices were high, allowing the FSP to 
                                               
5 The term decoupling denotes splitting the roaming and domestic services provided to a single subscriber (Infante, 2012). 
In its roaming regulation of 2012 (Roaming III), Europe included two methods for technical interaction between operators: 
the decoupling methods of single International Mobile Subscriber Identity (single IMSI) and Local Breakout (LBO). In its 
most recent Regulation of 2015, the European Commission abolished the obligation for operators to implement the single-
IMSI method, it was not commercially viable because of high negotiation and technical implementation cost. The LBO-
obligation is maintained, anticipating a larger demand for data roaming services in the future. 
  
take significant margins on his own cost (Falch and Tadayoni, 2014). Though local (national) 
competition has decreased domestic tariffs, the lack of competition on the international roaming 
market has left the wholesale roaming prices rather high when compared to the wholesale cost.  
As part of their policy, the EC has set wholesale caps for roaming. Finding a correct level for these 
caps is not easy. Setting the caps too low (below-cost) will put pressure on the FSP providing 
roaming to customers of foreign providers (again risking a raise in domestic pricing of this FSP) 
(BEREC, 2016). If these caps are too high, they will not achieve the intended goal. Hence, the best 
option is to set the wholesale caps just above the cost of the FSP, so there is a small margin that can 
be used to improve the quality of the visited network while the costs for the DSP are not too high. As 
mentioned in section 2, the European Commission has recently proposed new wholesale rates which 
will, if accepted, take effect from June 2017. 
 
4.3.4 Exemption mechanism 
Finally, the European Commission will include an exemption mechanism for the specific case when 
an operator is not able to recover its overall costs of providing roaming services (being forced to sell 
below cost) (European Commission, 2016c). In this case, the operator can be exempted from the 
obligation to provide RLAH and will be able to apply a surcharge for roaming services (the current 
proposal proposes maximal surcharge rates equal to the wholesale rates (as shown in Table 3; 
though this proposal has not been accepted yet), in order to ensure its business case. The details of 
this exemption mechanism, as well as the details of the Fair Use Limit, will be determined by the 
European Commission and published by 15 December 2016. 
 
5. Solutions and strategies for the future 
This final section takes the economic impact described in the previous section as input to discuss 
potential solutions and strategies for the future of mobile networks in Europe.  
 
5.1. Carrier portability and alternative SIM approaches 
Technical regulation in the form of number portability - enabling users to switch (domestic) network 
providers - is legally guaranteed in the European regulatory framework for fixed networks as well as 
for mobile networks. A proper extension of number portability to the concept of carrier portability 
can provide a solution for stimulating competition on the markets for international roaming from 
the customers  perspective (Knieps, 2014). In order to implement carrier portability, customers 
should have the right to switch mobile communications providers at any time. The switch should be 
carried out without undue delay within the shortest possible period of time. The following 
requirements for carrier portability are made (Knieps, 2014): 
(1) Users must have the option to buy a SIM-unlocked handset enabling the use of alternative 
SIM cards of different providers. This is a precondition for changing carriers for outgoing 
communications (voice, SMS, data services) in international roaming. The chosen FSP would 
provide the visiting customer with an identity in its network by means of a new SIM card. 
(2) Temporary number portability is an essential precondition for competition in the 
international mobile communications market. It allows mobile service customers to receive 
incoming voice, SMS and data roaming services on a visited network under their home 
mobile number when switching to a different provider only for a limited period of time or 
  
only for roaming services. Currently, this is rather difficult since the DSP has full control over 
the E.164 numbers6 of its customers, both for domestic and roaming services. 
(3) The DSP should not be regulatory enforced to carry out the billing function for international 
roaming services because the FSP also has the possibility to handle the billing for his 
roaming services. The DSP however should be regulatory obliged to provide the relevant 
source data on the identity and creditworthiness of its home customers if the DSP is not 
handling the billing. 
 
Carrier portability can be implemented if alternatives for the default hardware SIMs are used. On 
the one hand, there are physical SIMs with remote provisioning (such as the Apple SIM), on the 
other hand, there are soft SIMs (GSMA Intelligence, 2015). 
SIMs with remote provisioning capabilities are very similar to ordinary SIMs (they can be removed 
from the (smart)phone or tablet), the main difference is that these SIMs can store the credentials of 
multiple mobile networks. This means that customers can buy multiple packages (from different 
mobile operators, even in different countries). A precondition of course is that the (smart)phone is 
not SIM-locked. Remote provisioning would allow and end-user to easily switch (churn) between 
mobile operators; while abroad a user might choose to buy a local mobile package because it is 
cheaper than roaming. Even in the case of RLAH (zero retail roaming fees), it may be more 
interesting to buy a local package from a foreign mobile operator than using your domestic volume 
(taking into account the current domestic prices - Figure 5). 
Soft SIMS are (as the name indicates) entirely software based and are no longer a combination of 
software and cryptographic hardware. These could, much as SIMs with remote provisioning, store 
the credentials of multiple mobile operators.  The main difference between both types is the fact 
that a soft SIM is not built on top of cryptographic hardware. Soft SIMS hence require the 
applications (the software) to store the credentials necessary for implementing the same security 
measures as a hardware SIM. 
 
5.2. Strategies for big operators: cross-border competition and traffic steering 
As mentioned above, cross-country operators have significant advantages over national operators. 
Given the fact that the wholesale roaming market has an oligopolistic character (transaction costs 
make dealing with more than three/four operators per country not economically viable), larger 
operators are frequently preferred over smaller ones. Not only give these asymmetric traffic flows 
the larger operators leverage over smaller ones (wholesale roaming agreements are generally driven 
by amounts of traffic that can be offered by the FSP), avoiding them is often hard because of their 
larger network coverage and capacity. This section details the best strategies for large, international 
operators to maximize their business case, though some may conflict with smaller operators' goals. 
The best way for larger, international operators to further leverage their negotiation and scales 
power, is to direct roamers to preferred networks. By using this process of traffic steering, the DSP 
can make sure the customer s traffic is steered  over the foreign network of the DSP s choosing. 
Furthermore, cross-country operators can internalize roaming costs by steering the customer s 
traffic to one of its subsidiaries that is operating in the travel destination. This type of cross-border 
                                               
6
 E.164 sets the general format for international telephone numbers and is part of the international public 
telecommunication numbering plan (an ITU-T recommendation).  
  
competition results in more affordable access and pan-European (cross-country) networks implying 
cost reductions for both network deployment and operating expenditures effectively benefiting 
from economies of scale.  
This method is already used today: over the last years, a significant increase in the number of 
mergers in the mobile telecom market can be observed for example in Austria (Hutchinson/Orange), 
Ireland (Three/Telefonica), Belgium (Liberty Global/Base) and Germany (Telefonica/E-Plus). 
However, due to the boundaries set by spectrum auctions and the country-specific IMSI 
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity) codes, the European telecom sector remains heavily 
fragmented: access availability, quality and prices vary significantly across the continent with 
telecom markets defined by national borders. To stimulate cross-border competition, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU could use their regulatory powers 
to make it relatively more attractive to operate cross-border networks instead of focusing on 
domestic markets (Aghion, 2002). A possible policy is introducing supra-national allocation of radio 
spectrum (Mariniello, 2105). Now, the allocation in the EU is done by Member States within a 
framework of international coordination and harmonization, designed to counter cross-border 
interference. Auctions in different countries are run at different times, each assignment procedure 
has its own participation cost, bidders that want to operate in multiple countries are likely to 
calculate their bids for individual lots and face the risk of paying too much in early auctions if they 
fail to secure complementing licenses in later auctions, etc. This not only hinders the creation of 
operators with a larger European footprint, but also has a negative effect on network coverage and 
penetration. A move towards EU-level assignment of spectrum could prove to be a solution that 
incentivizes the deployment of networks with a larger European footprint. 
On the downside, and important to be mentioned, stimulating this strategy gives large MNOs an 
advantage over smaller ones and may result in reduced overall competition in the market, increased 
pressure put on the smaller operators, leading eventually to higher prices for customers. This trade-
off between larger merging operators, having more wholesale negotiating power, and protecting 
smaller companies currently is  and will remain  a difficult balancing act. 
5.3. Strategies for smaller operators: IMSI beyond national borders or stricter 
regulation? 
It is clear that MVNOs and smaller operators should remain on the market (see above), but that 
specific strategies should be followed to ensure this. This section sums a number of potential 
solutions that could prove beneficial for the market position and economic viability of smaller 
operators (including MVNOs).  
One of the advantages of cross-country operators is that they can steer traffic to subsidiaries 
operating in different countries. Smaller operators without such subsidiaries or partners cannot do 
this, they are linked to the country-specific IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity). Recently, 
the Belgian (BIPT) and Luxembourg (ILR) telecom regulators made it possible to link a Luxembourg 
IMSI to a Belgian mobile number and the other way around (BIPT, 2016b). This is an interesting 
strategy since IMSIs are normally bound by national borders. The agreement makes it possible for 
operators to offer their services directly (i.e. not using IMR) to customers in both their own country 
of operation and the other country while using either a location-based or a uniform pricing. By 
signing bilateral agreements with operators from other countries for a kind of usage-based network 
lease , domestic operators can provide their users a transparent experience and themselves be 
reduced of high wholesale fees. For smaller operators, this presents a more attractive option than a 
pure wholesale negotiation process, as larger operators (1) prefer a reciprocal agreement with other 
  
large operators based on the balanced/unbalanced pricing model and (2) because they often 
renounce starting the costly and time-consuming negotiation process for low volumes of traffic.  
Hence, this option of signing bilateral agreements based on pan-national IMSI may help smaller 
operators to secure their business case against high roaming fees. The European Commission could 
stimulate this by setting a unified Mobile Country Code for the whole of Europe. Another option that 
can secure the business case of smaller operators is a stricter regulation. If all operators would be 
obliged to disclose their wholesale fees to all NRAs, the latter would have a better overview of 
potential market failures and could interfere accordingly. However, given the variety and diversity in 
operators and offers across Europe, applying a specific tariff for each individual situation is in 
practice not feasible. Although it is true that clear differences of negotiated wholesale rates exists, 
one cannot judge that the cheapest wholesale rates should be applied to all other operators, or that 
contracts with higher wholesale tariffs are subject to excessive pricing. 
A third option, specifically for MVNOs, to render the latter's business case more sustainable and to 
circumvent their lack of leverage, would be to impose a rule that allows MVNOs to obtain the same 
conditions and charges for wholesale roaming services as their host-MNO has negotiated with other 
FSPs. The tricky side to this solution would be that business-sensitive information between two 
parties (the DSP and the FSP) needs to be revealed to a third party, the MVNO in question. 
 
5.4.  like a  instead of  like at ? 
As discussed above, one of the potential hazards of RLAH is that users might be tempted to buy a 
SIM-card from a cheaper foreign operator and thus constantly roam, also when in their domestic 
country. As a countermeasure, the EC is looking into fair use limits to counter this so-called 
permanent roaming (see section 4.2.2). Alternatively, instead of RLAH, one could suggest roaming 
like a local  (RLAL) which was introduced in 2011 by BEREC (BEREC, 2014b) and discussed in (Marcus, 
2013). The idea behind RLAL is simple enough; pricing structures can be implemented such that - 
when abroad - roaming users can be charged, by their DSP, the same prices as the current average 
prices of the country they are visiting.  
This would clearly tackle the issue of permanent roaming, as choosing a foreign operator will no 
longer result in cheaper prices compared to local operators. However, this approach lacks consumer 
transparency and, more importantly, simplicity as retail roaming prices cannot be considered 
uniform (different types and sizes of bundles, unlimited packages, etc.) and may either be higher or 
lower than in the domestic country7. Additionally, this approach requires the EC to provide regular 
updates of the average prices for each country (or worse, to have each MNO be in possession of the 
latest tariff plans for all bundles for all subscribers, across data, voice and SMS, for all Member 
States) and requires mobile operators to adjust their pricing accordingly, which will no doubt lead to 
additional overhead and a more difficult billing process. These are exactly the reasons which made 
RLAL the less attractive approach compared to RLAH. 
 
                                               
7 Indeed, mobile prices have always varied significantly across Member States and still do, with average retail revenues per 
user (ARPU) in 2015 ranging from  per month in Latvia to  25.40 per month in Norway, with a weighted average of 
 per month (BEREC, 2016b). 
  
5.5. Wi-Fi offloading as a complement for mobile data roaming 
Wi-Fi has more than once been proposed as a viable solution for offloading mobile data as it offers 
cheap access to the Internet (Marcus, 2013). In Europe, a number of examples can be found of 
mobile operators offering so called dual-access wireless networks (combining both mobile and Wi-
Fi). If sufficient access points are installed, Wi-Fi access is available in all public places, allowing users 
to effectively switch between mobile data and Wi-Fi.  
When abroad, users typically use Wi-Fi only when stationary (in a coffee shop, in a hotel, ) as these 
offer (free) Wi-Fi access; as a result, Wi-Fi seems an unlikely solution for offloading data when 
roaming. However, as mobile operators have started to team up, sharing their Wi-Fi networks with 
other operators, they have managed to also provide Wi-Fi access to their users when roaming. The 
best example for this in Europe is the FON-network (FON, n.d.). FON joins a set of (inter)national Wi-
Fi networks into one single network. Operators choosing to cooperate with FON, open up their 
network by broadcasting a FON-SSID, effectively allowing users of other operators to go online. In 
return, their own users can enjoy free Wi-Fi access via FON when abroad.  
Another example is the initiative as proposed by the European Commission: WiFi4EU (Euopean 
Commission, 2016e) which proposes an investment of 120 million to deploy free Wi-Fi access in 
public spaces. The WiFi4EU scheme is expected to be approved in 2017. 
As reaching a ubiquitous Wi-Fi coverage is not feasible in practice, Wi-Fi should be seen as 
complementary service to roaming, as it can effectively reduce the overall roaming usage, but can 
never fully substitute it. 
6. Summary and conclusion 
Roaming in Europe has gone through multiple processes of regulation since 2007, first imposing 
wholesale and retail price caps for voice services, then for SMS and finally for data. The next step is 
lowering roaming prices to the level of domestic retail prices, which will permit users to roam like at 
home. However, there are several aspects that the EC still has to clarify, especially for the operators, 
as there are doubts about how they are going to sustain this transition: while the fee end users pay 
for roaming will be reduced to zero, the fee a domestic mobile operator pays the foreign operator 
will not.  
 
As operators see a decline in revenue, they could look for new possibilities to cover their costs. The 
impact for the customers of these approaches will strongly depend on how the providers cope with 
these regulations: increasing domestic pricing may prove to generate an unwanted outcome given 
the potential negative impact on the operator s customer base. Other approaches may include the 
further decrease of wholesale roaming prices or the implementation of the FULs. 
 
The real impact of the latest roaming initiative of the EC, Roaming Like At Home, is hard to predict as 
the outcome will differ per operator and depends on a lot of factors: the geographic location, the 
number of countries in which the operator is active and whether the operator is a MNO or MVNO; 
an advantage for a larger operator can easily prove to be a disadvantage for a smaller one. There is 
no universal strategy applicable for every MNO because of their inherent diversity and, correlated, 
the various heterogeneous markets in which they are active. As long as significant structural 
differences between EU countries continue to exist, it will be hard to come up with a single ideal 
solution for uniform roaming tariffs in the entire EU. 
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